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Introduction
An interview with one of the leading and best known 
representatives of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics
He is Research Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Research Initiative at 
We ern Sydney University. 
His work covers a range of areas and themes: Hermeneutics; Ethics; Ancient Philosophy; 
Post-Kantian Continental Philosophy (esp. Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadam-
er, Derrida); Aesthetics; Literary Criticism; German Romanticism.  Some of his recent books: 
Idioms of Ethical Life (2018, forthcoming); Idiome der Wahrheit (2014); Between Word and Image 
(2013); Foreword to and revised translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time (2010); Difficulties of 
Ethical Life (2008, co-edited with Shannon Sullivan); Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Pe-
riphery of the Word, Freedom, and History (2005); On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical 
Life (2001); Hermeneutische Wege: Hans-Georg Gadamer zum Hundertsten (2000, co-edited with 
Günter Figal), “Series in Continental Philosophy” (over 164 titles). 
After I finished my book Filosofar com Gadamer e Platão: Hermenêutica filosófica a partir da 
Carta Sétima (2018), under his supervision at Penn State, I decided to make this interview in 
order to address some themes in his work and his views on the state of philosophy today.
Luiz Rohden (LR): Dennis, I know that you have been deeply influenced by Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics and that your relationship with Hans-Georg Gadamer was very important to you. 
Could you tell us about your relationship with Gadamer and could you  eak as well about the 
sort of person Gadamer was?
Dennis Schmidt (DS): Before I turn to your questions, my friend, I want to thank you for 
your work and e ecially for this book. Our conversations during your time at Penn State Univer-
sity in 2015, during my visit to Unisinos in 2013, and over the years of our correspondence have 
been important to me. Your book on Gadamer and Plato, and your starting point with Plato’s 7th 
Letter, is a project close to my own heart and one that has helped me immensely with my own 
work. I have long thought that Gadamer was a Greek at heart and your project has understood 
that. It is perhaps the best way to approach the problems of hermeneutics today and so I am 
grateful for your work. 
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I am also very grateful for the questions that you have 
put to me. I have postponed replying for too long for the sim-
ple reason that your questions are challenges to me and press 
me to ask about some of my own deepest concerns. I do not 
believe I have answered your questions sufficiently, but that 
is simply because they go to the heart of my own concerns. I 
know though that our conversation and questions will con-
tinue for a long time to come. That is something I welcome.   
Meeting Gadamer was one of the great turning points of 
my life.4 I first met him in 1975, when he came to Boston Col-
lege to teach for a seme er. He was 75 years old and I was a 
beginning graduate student in philosophy who did not know 
that Gadamer was a famous philosopher. Like many begin-
nings, my first encounters with Gadamer are now shrouded 
in a bit of a fog that has blended years, conversations, memory, 
and stories told, so it is a bit difficult to sort out the details of 
that first year of our relationship. As I recall, he taught two 
seminars that seme er: one on Plato and the other on Hegel 
and Heidegger, and I was enrolled in both of his classes. I had 
excellent teachers in other classes and in my earlier studies, 
but Gadamer’s classes were riveting and would define my own 
understanding of what teaching could be like at its best. His 
English was adequate, but his ability to communicate was re-
markable – it was then that I learned that one could commu-
nicate and converse with someone even if one was not fluent 
in a language. Gadamer’s limitations with English grammar 
and vocabulary were not insignificant, but he listened to his 
conversation partner and somehow was able to engage them 
more fully than most others, even native  eakers. Already in 
this first year of our relationship, I came to think of Gadamer 
as “hermeneutic Mensch”, as someone with a gift for engaging 
others and genuinely able to find a way to let language be a 
real bond with others. There was something like poetry in his 
way of confronting the limits of his fluency in English – he 
never let those limits inhibit his attempts to  eak, rather he 
took them as challenges to find ever better ways of  eaking.
I soon learned that Gadamer was indeed a celebrated 
philosopher and so the intimidation that a young doctoral 
student invariably feels before his or her professor was am-
plified by Gadamer’s fame. I was always timid, afraid to  eak 
to him, but he was quite the opposite: he was open-minded, 
curious, and completely unpretentious.  Over time, my intim-
idation before Gadamer began to diminish, but my admira-
tion for him only grew. I hung on his words in class and rel-
ished the opportunity to talk with him in private.  
The same year we met the first translation of Truth and 
Method into English was published and this would become 
the occasion for me to come to have a number of private con-
versations with Gadamer. Since I read German, he asked me 
to discuss the English translation of his own book with him. 
He said that he was never really sure about many of the trans-
lations of key terms and that he was frequently puzzled by 
how his English language readers understood him. Sensitive 
to the role of translation in understanding, Gadamer knew 
that he needed to “hear” himself in English. So, we would read 
passages of Truth and Method together. At times, I would cor-
rect his pronunciation so that he could  eak about his own 
text clearly; at times, we would discuss the translation and 
how some of the words would be heard in English. We did 
this in his rooms at the “Robert’s House”, which was the Jesu-
it home where Gadamer would stay during his visits. Those 
conversations would be so basic, so profound that I do not 
know if I would be who I am today without them. We spoke 
of language, of understanding, of  eech and accents, and of 
his aims in Truth and Method.  He was always generous, always 
intere ed in my completely uninformed, if earnest, opinion, 
and always engaging. We had those discussions so that he 
could sharpen his English, but it is clear that for me they were 
the events of a lifetime.  
Language was often at the center of our discussions even 
when I was a young student. I translated some texts for him 
and reviewing those translations was always an occasion for 
real conversations. We spoke German together, but would 
 eak about words in Greek, German, English, Italian, and 
French – and it was always more than talk about words, but a 
way of talking about understanding and the world.  
One other topic of discussion from those early days was 
Heidegger. He always spoke of Heidegger with great admira-
tion. Just as I then and still now  eak of Gadamer in glowing 
terms, so too did Gadamer  eak of Heidegger with the eyes 
of the young student he was when he first met Heidegger. 
When he spoke of Heidegger, Gadamer always returned – at 
least at the start – to being a young student who was stunned 
by a great philosophical mind. I realized that this admiration 
was very likely a repetition of the admiration that Plato had 
for Socrates and that students have had for teachers for cen-
turies. I knew early on that Heidegger was the great riddle of 
Gadamer’s life, just as Gadamer would become the riddle of 
my own life.
That meeting in 1975 would be the beginning of one of 
the most important relationships in my life. It would take an-
other lifetime to  eak about that relationship, to  eak about 
Gadamer, and to address just what it means to have another 
person as such a central riddle in one’s own life. By the time of 
Gadamer’s death in 2002, we would be good friends, almost 
like a father and son in many ways, and strangely his death has 
not really diminished his presence in my life. I su ect that I 
will need much longer to even begin to make sense of what he 
came to represent for me.  
I can say this: that Gadamer was a person of great and 
good humor, generous to others, and a genuinely curious and 
open mind. He truly believed something that I have trouble 
accepting: that all people want to be reasonable and that ev-
eryone has something to teach me. In short, he was a Socratic 
4 I discuss this meaning and its significance for me in a somewhat different way in my essay published on the occasion of Gadamer’s 
100th birthday, “Socrates mit Gehstock,” in Begegnungen mit Hans-Georg Gadamer (2000, p. 137-146).
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figure – and this was not at all a posture, but really his nature. 
He listened to first year students or his haircutter with the 
same openness and curiosity that he would bring to a conver-
sation with world-class philosophers. He looked at paintings 
with sophistication, but with the eyes of one just ready to be 
open, and he loved to learn poems to recite. Two experiences 
that I had with Gadamer surrounding the events celebrating 
his 100th birthday are revealing. A photographer came to take 
pictures of him for a book that showcased ten 100-year-old 
people who continued to accomplish much. After the pho-
tographer left, Gadamer remarked that a book on one hun-
dred year-olds would be much more interesting. The other 
experience was an interview on his birthday by an Italian 
television journalist who asked Gadamer the “secret to a long 
life”. His answer: “learn a poem by heart every day and never 
take an elevator” – stay alive in mind and body.  
Gadamer’s wit and humor were very much at the core 
of his chara er – and they were invariably ways in which 
he taught as well. On one occasion Gadamer faced a rath-
er obnoxious and long-winded question after a talk he had 
given; the questioner rather pompously concluded “surely 
Professor Gadamer, you must agree with me that it is far 
more difficult to understand Heraclitus than your next door 
neighbor”. Gadamer paused, removed his glasses, rubbed his 
face and said, “I guess that depends on who your next door 
neighbor is”. He kept conversations real and never abstract, 
and so one inevitably felt the weight and real stakes of phil-
osophical discussions.
Gadamer was never comfortable in the role of a famous 
philosopher. He was humble – genuinely so – and enjoyed 
people. He also lost himself in books, e ecially the Greeks, 
and found a world of conversation there. Over the years, I de-
veloped my differences with him philosophically, sometimes 
politically too, but my admiration and even love for him only 
ever grew. He was not a perfect person, but he was genuine 
and honest and caring. He made the world a more interesting, 
decent, and even better place for me.  
LR: How would you describe the state and situation of 
hermeneutics today?
DS: I worry about the present state of philosophy gen-
erally and am e ecially worried about the status of herme-
neutic thought today. We live in an age of digital texts, of the 
 eedy circulation of ideas, of responses that do not always 
seem to be very responsible replies to others. Universities are 
pressing younger colleagues to publish more and faster – this 
is not a novel problem, but it is accelerated by technology and 
the Internet – and the time one needs for reading and under-
standing always seems to be out of reach. The rapid turnover 
of ideas and arguments does not leave much time for reflec-
tion and careful criticism. To be sure, there is an availability 
of information and dissemination of texts that has opened 
up new worlds for thinking, but the  eed that seems to ac-
company this expansion has blunted real discussion. Political 
discourse today is reduced to tweets and philosophizing is 
carried on in blogs. Words flash across screens, but few seem 
to have time for reading.
I mention this because philosophy has always needed 
time and patience. It is built upon careful reflection upon 
what is said and about how words and arguments are to be 
understood. These conditions for philosophy are only min-
imal (and they are perhaps not even sufficient for philoso-
phy), but they seem to be in jeopardy today. Speed and “the 
next thing” seem to define even academic life today, and if 
that is indeed the case, then some of the real conditions of 
philosophizing are in danger of being lost today in the noise 
of the present. I sometimes wonder if my view on this matter 
is simply the reflection of becoming stale in my own views 
and of simply resisting new possibilities. But I do believe it is 
important for us to raise questions today about the pro ects 
of philosophy generally in our time. Philosophy has played an 
important role in the development of cultures and e ecially 
in forging critical per ectives that can open us to new possi-
bilities. It has always been at the margins of a culture – even 
the setting of Plato’s dialogue the Republic at the city limits 
makes this clear – but today the risk is that philosophy will 
simply be absorbed into the empire of technology that will 
increasingly define the possibilities of any culture.  
There is no tradition of philosophizing that is more ded-
icated to fostering and thinking the conditions of philosophy 
than hermeneutics. Hermeneutics has always been centered 
upon a concern for the conditions of understanding: of lan-
guage, reading, translation, conversation, and of critique. 
Above all, hermeneutics is a matter of developing the capac-
ity to listen. This seems more necessary than ever. Of course, 
hermeneutic theory is far more than this, but if nothing else 
this is something that we find in hermeneutic theory and its 
pra ices that is sorely needed in our time.  
It is difficult to think of centers for research in herme-
neutics. Universities in the European and Anglophone world 
tend to be too diverse to have a strong concentration in one 
field. This, I believe, is a good thing too since it has the effect 
of bringing different traditions and projects into conversa-
tion with one another. There are, however, extra-university 
groups and societies that have long helped maintain the her-
meneutic tradition. Here one thinks of the “Hermeneutik 
Symposium” held annually at the University of Freiburg (it 
began with Gadamer at the University of Heidelberg), the 
Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Italy, SPEP and NASPH 
in the United States, and ASCP in Australia. Journals and 
book series too help to promote the best in this tradition. The 
hope, of course, is to be found in the next generation. This is 
something I learned from Gadamer and his very real interest 
in younger philosophers. He knew that the strength of a tra-
dition is found in its future as much, if not more, than its past 
or present.  
This future will be international and I know that in Bra-
zil there is a great energy behind research and work in the her-
meneutical tradition. There are traditions in Italy and France, 
as well as in North America and Britain that keep alive the 
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hermeneutic tradition that still has its roots in Germany. But 
as we move forward, I expect that there will be a more in-
ternational cast to the way hermeneutic theory evolves. That 
is an exciting pro ect as other languages and other histories 
come into the discussions we need to have.
LR: How do you understand the relation between what 
is called analytic philosophy and continental philosophy? 
How do you understand the emergence of this division in 
philosophy, its significance for philosophy in general, and how 
we are to work with it?  
DS: I tend to be a bit dogmatic about the way we are to 
think about the various traditions of philosophy that define 
the present age. More precisely, it seems to me that the struc-
ture of the university, above all the disciplinary distinctions 
that articulate departments and lines of funding, teaching, 
and research have come to harden over time.  There are a 
number of fields of research – and here I definitely would 
count philosophy as one – that have evolved a great deal over 
the years. Nonetheless, institutional structures hold different 
lines of research together as if they shared a genuinely com-
mon bond. To put the point rather bluntly: departments are 
defined by ideas and images of knowledge that no longer re-
flect the state of a field of research. This situation has bred 
academic fights and territorial disputes. In extreme cases, we 
can have the same philosophy department represented by 
a mathematical logician and a linguist, as well as a cultural 
critic and a literary theorist. Historians of philosophy are 
deemed not philosophers, analytic philosophers argue that 
the continental tradition is simply gibberish, and continental 
philosophers argue that analytic philosophers have lost sight 
of the real questions of philosophy. This plays out differently 
in different cultures and even in different universities. I have 
moved to four different universities and been closely affiliated 
with two others and have always been struck by the fact that 
the lines of division are never the same.  
To be sure, it is difficult to talk to someone who is work-
ing out of different texts, different assumptions, and different 
histories than one’s own. That is always the struggle behind 
every conversation. But, as we become increasingly  ecial-
ized and live ever more in our own bubbles, this problem 
becomes more difficult. And sometimes the struggle to find 
common grounds for a conversation is not worth the effort. 
Sometimes we simply have different questions and problems 
that we need to address and it is only the fact of sharing a de-
partment that forces us to have such struggles and such fights. 
My own rather stubborn interpretation is that not every-
thing that happens in a philosophy department really should 
be understood as part of the long tradition of philosophy that 
begins with Plato. I also would say that philosophy does not 
have a unique hold on truth nor that owning a department is 
ultimately important.
As I understand it, one way of chara erizing the differ-
ence that divides so much of philosophy today has more to 
do with the questions one asks rather than the approach one 
takes or the texts one takes up. In other words, one is not a 
continental philosopher because one reads texts from Euro-
pean authors, nor is one an analytic philosopher because one 
traces one’s roots back to certain authors going back to Ox-
ford or Cambridge. I would prefer to say that the difference 
has to do with how one conceives the measure of truth and 
how one understands the aim of philosophy. More precise-
ly, I would understand continental philosophy as the tradi-
tion – largely traceable back to Kant’s Third Critique and its 
reception by Hegel and Schelling – that recognizes that our 
relation to truth is not only a cognitive and conceptually de-
fined relation. Kant argued that a feeling, the “feeling of life,” 
opened up an experience that needed to be understood as a 
priori and yet did not submit itself to the rule of the concept. 
Such an experience was the foundation of judgment in the re-
flective sense and the summit of this form of judgment was to 
expose beauty as the symbol of moral life and the purposeless 
purpositivity of nature itself.  
This is not the place to trace Kant’s arguments in any 
detail,5 but what can be said is that the Critique of Judgment 
opened a new possibility for philosophizing, namely, the 
possibility that truth is not only measured by conceptual 
reason and that an experience that resists such reason could 
nonetheless be a priori. The preeminent realm of this expe-
rience that requires a symbolic, rather than schematic, form 
is found in aesthetic experience. More precisely, it is found 
in the judgment of taste about beauty.  This was a possibility 
that was excluded since Plato exiled the poets from the polis, 
and this exclusion had long defined the nature of philosophy 
itself,6 which is why Kant’s Critique of Judgment marks such 
a radically new possibility in the history of philosophy. Kant 
demonstrated that truth could be found in the realm of the 
beautiful, lodged in a feeling that cannot be captured by the 
logic of the concept. Since the language of philosophy has long 
been understood to be defined by the logic and demands of 
conceptual reason, it is easy to see how Kant’s analysis opens 
up the possibility of philosophizing in a different way than 
that defined by the history of metaphysics. This is the point in 
the history of philosophy where philosophy split into rather 
different traditions. Of course, the history of philosophy has 
always been a history of differences and contentiousness, but 
now the differences were fundamental since they concerned 
the horizons of truth and the reach of the logos itself.  
The tradition that we now call continental philosophy 
is, in many ways, a misnomer since it is a tradition only con-
5 I have done this in a number of places, but most succinctly in On Germans and Other Greeks (Schmidt, 2001, p. 73-88) and Lyrical and 
Ethical Subjects (Schmidt, 2005, p. 7-19).
6 Let me say clearly that I do not believe that Plato held the view that such an exclusion made sense; however, the effective history of 
Platonism and the formation of a tradition of metaphysics clearly has formulated this view and been defined by it. 
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tingently defined by its relation to its geographical roots in 
Europe. It is rather better to define this tradition by its read-
iness to consider art, literature, and music to be legitimate 
fields of inquiry and not simply matters of “aesthetic theory.” 
Of course, there are points of common concern between the 
continental and analytic traditions, and those points can be 
productive moments for discussions. However, there are, at 
times, quite simply radically different concerns and questions 
that drive these traditions, and to force a dialogue when one is 
not needed has never seemed helpful to me.
LR: What role do you see for the approach of philosoph-
ical hermeneutics in largest context of philosophy today? 
DS: It seems to me that the hermeneutic tradition, 
which is defined by its emphasis on listening and on dialogue, 
is e ecially important in the larger context of philosophy to-
day. It is not dialogue for the sake of dialogue that hermeneu-
tic theory promotes, but dialogue for the sake of understand-
ing. Here a qualification is needed: understanding, which 
is the real goal of hermeneutic pra ices, is not the same as 
knowledge. This difference is not always easy to clarify, but it 
is all-important. Perhaps the two clearest presentations of this 
difference between understanding and knowing are found in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (sections 31-33) and in Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method (section I on “The Meaning of the Human-
istic Tradition for the Humanities”). What one finds in those 
texts is an argument that presents understanding as more 
fundamental than any cognition. This is significant because 
understanding is open to feeling, mood, and what Gadam-
er refers to as the elements of “Bildung”. This argument has a 
direct line to Kant’s Critique of Judgment and its validation of 
aesthetic experience and judgment.  
What makes this e ecially important in the context 
of the present historical juncture in philosophy is that while 
philosophy has generally demonstrated a tendency to become 
 ecialized and to close itself off from the world in abstrac-
tions that  eak only to other philosophers, the aim of a her-
meneutic sensibility is to open the world to forms of experi-
ence that are not abstract, but rather lived experiences. This 
seems to me to be e ecially important in a time that has seen 
philosophy become increasingly academic and cut-off from 
the world, and that finds philosophers often unable even to 
understand one another. This effort to find ways of dialogu-
ing with others and of recognizing that the foundations of 
truth might not only be defined by the orbit of philosophy’s 
own forms of thinking might, if we are lucky, keep philoso-
phizing alive and vital in our world.  
One caveat: when we who work out of the hermeneu-
tic/continental tradition begin to close in upon ourselves and 
 eak only to ourselves with our own  ecial vocabulary, we 
become instances of one of the main problems with philos-
ophizing today. To be sure, there will always be the need for 
new words, for  ecialized vocabularies, and for details that 
require work and struggle to understand. My worry about 
the  ecialization driving philosophy is not a way of arguing 
that philosophy should be “easy” or readily comprehensible. 
Philosophy is a demanding work; it requires a rigor, patience, 
and attention that are quite extraordinary. At times, meet-
ing these requirements requires in turn that one develop new 
ways of  eaking about issues. However, when we lose our 
roots in real experience and in the concretion of ideas, we too 
become part of the problem with academic life today. Teach-
ing is one way in which one is always required to remember 
to  eak clearly and that is one reason why teaching is so im-
portant for philosophy today – it can help keep us honest 
about what we really understand. I should add that this is one 
reason I have long thought of teaching as a sort of model for 
hermeneutic pra ices.  
LR: Could you  eak about the general path of your 
work? In particular, could you  eak to what you take to be 
the central and driving themes of your work as well as the 
direction you see it moving forward?
DS: It is strangely difficult to  eak about one’s own 
work as a general project. One is always involved in some  e-
cific project – whether it be a course one is teaching, an article 
or talk one is preparing, or a book one is writing – and this 
project has a tendency to blot out a larger sense of one’s larg-
er concerns. My most recent book concerns forms of truth7 
and the last seminar I taught was on Hegel and Kant (on the 
topic of natural beauty). Recent articles have been about mu-
sic, Paul Klee, gardens, imagination, and Heidegger’s political 
involvements. So, one finds oneself stretched over a number 
of themes and topics all at once. But it has become clear to me 
that the question of ethical life has dominated my concerns 
and guided most every question for the past two decades. I 
su ect that this question was already present in significant 
ways earlier, but it seems to be in the mid-1990s that my in-
terest in searching for a new ethical sensibility began. During 
that time I found myself reading and writing more about 
Paul Celan and Friedrich Hölderlin, having to confront new 
questions about Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis, and 
quite engaged with Kant’s Third Critique. Those were also 
the years in which my conversations with Gadamer would 
lead me back over and over to Aristotle and his way of think-
ing about phronesis. It was during these years that I turned my 
attention to Greek tragedy as a way of thinking ethical life.
Starting with On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy 
and Ethical Life, I increasingly focused my work on thinking 
through the difficulties of ethical questioning. It had become 
clear to me that ethical questions began when there was am-
biguity, irreconcilable conflict, and incommensurable yet 
equally reasonable demands. In short, ethics emerges as a 
question at the point that Greek tragedy had always taken as 
its core concern: a conflict or contradiction that was simply 
impossible to resolve. In the course of working on Greek trag-
7 Idiome der Wahrheit (Schmidt and Mirković, 2014).
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edies a number of new themes came to occupy my attention: 
moral blindness, death and mourning, family and state, love 
and duty, as well as war and suffering. This was a pivotal mo-
ment for me and it belonged quite directly to an engagement 
with works of art as much as with philosophical texts.  
This project opened me up to ways of  eaking about 
ethical life that I had not considered before. In particular, I 
came to understand how much the questions of ethical life 
are wedded ineluctably to the riddle that I am for myself. 
There are philosophical precedents for this point, but I do not 
believe that these precedents have been pursued as a ively 
as possible with re ect to ethical concerns. Without engag-
ing his treatment of this complex yet crucial notion, let me 
suggest that one place one can find such a precedent is Heide-
gger’s analysis of death, anxiety, and being-toward-death in 
Being and Time. There one finds a philosophical analysis of this 
singularity of fa ical life that I now believe needs to be un-
derstood as ethically significant (but that Heidegger himself 
strips of all such significance). The best way to express this 
that I have found is to say that I am, one might say, an “idiom” 
– untranslatable, stubbornly wedded to being this singular 
being that I am. This life is mine to live and to answer for, 
and understanding myself to be mortal is at the heart of this 
self-understanding. It is not the “cogito sum” that exposes me 
to myself, but the “sum moribundus”. In this inescapable mi-
neness of existence I learn that this existence I mine to bear, it 
is my burden, and that I will have been responsible for it. This 
is the point at which we can  eak of something like the birth 
of responsibility: nothing, no one, can lift the burden of being 
answerable to life from me. Kant makes a similar point when 
he  eaks of the need to understand oneself as an end, as what 
should not be subordinated to anything else. What Kant re-
minds us (but Heidegger seems to forget) is that I also come 
to know myself as living in a kingdom of such ends; that is, I 
live among others who bear the same responsibility, the same 
weight of mineness as me: there is, in other words, a strange 
sort of solidarity to be found in my radical solitude. I bear the 
burden of existence, but never of the whole of existence. This 
is what it means to say that I must understand myself as living 
in a moral universe: I know myself to be ineluctably responsi-
ble, even if I also know myself as living in a world beyond my 
control and understanding. This, in part, is the point at which 
something like the discussion of ethical life can begin anew.
Since my book on tragedy this notion of the being of an 
idiom – more precisely, of being an idiom that is constitutive-
ly related to others and who is equally always in relation to 
an ideal – has become the central theme of my own work. 
My intention has not been to turn this notion of the idiom 
into a rigid concept, but to take this as a problem that will 
never fully be resolved and yet will serve as a starting point 
for reflection. Experiences that one thinks out of this sense 
of being an idiom are those that we undergo in our singu-
larity – experiences such as suffering, pain, mourning, love 
– which are not merely singular but which open up upon 
shared senses of understanding, something akin to that which 
Kant discussed as a matter of a “sensus communis.” I have also 
increasingly found that art is able to present this life of the 
idiom, this singularity that resists conceptualization, much 
better than philosophical argument. This does not mean that 
I think it necessary to abandon philosophy or argument, or 
that I would myself move to the arts. Quite the contrary, the 
care and careful unfolding – the interpretive work – of phi-
losophy is needed if these presentations are to be understood.
I need to make one final remark about my work and 
this deepening of a sense of the ethical import of philosophy. 
It is important to qualify what the word “ethics” can mean 
if this sense of ethical life as rooted in the being of the idi-
om is to be possible.  Ethics is not to be understood as a set 
of rules or imperatives for a ion or decision. It is not to be 
understood as a theory that is applied to pra ices; indeed, 
it is not to be understood as operating at all according to any 
sort of distinction between theory and pra ice. Rather, ethics 
is a form of pra ice and self-understanding. It is the process 
of transforming oneself in order to live well and to be “bet-
ter.” I have frequently described ethical reflection by enlisting 
Plutarch’s notion of “ethopoeisis.” In the end, ethical life is an 
on-going work, the work of trying to live in the world. This, 
in some ways, is what is meant by Heraclitus’ fragment 119 
ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίµων and what Aristotle meant when he 
spoke of εὐδαιµονία. In the end, those comments on ethos 
drive quite directly to what I have struggled to bring into my 
own work.
LR: Could you comment on the argument that I have 
advanced in my book Filosofar com Gadamer e Platão: Her-
menêutica filosófica a partir da Carta Sétima (2018), that we 
would do well to re-read Plato’s work and that philosophical 
hermeneutics is an e ecially helpful way to approach this 
task? Do you see Plato, and  ecifically Plato’s 7th Letter as 
significant for Gadamer and for understanding philosophi-
cal hermeneutics? 
DS: I could not agree more with your thesis and with 
the approach you have taken to Gadamer and to hermeneu-
tic theory in general. You are exactly right when taking Plato 
as a clue for understanding philosophical hermeneutics and 
I believe you are also right in finding Gadamer to be one of 
the most sensitive readers of Plato we have available to us. I 
frequently joked with Gadamer that he was not really a Ger-
man, but that that he was an ancient Greek philosopher at 
heart. He always enjoyed those conversations and that line of 
joking with him – I think the enjoyment he found in this joke 
was that it was founded in a real truth: Gadamer approached 
philosophy in a way that resonated more with Plato than al-
most any other figure in philosophy’s history. Even more than 
Heidegger, Plato is, to my mind, the best entrance into Ga-
damer’s thought: even when Gadamer is not explicitly dis-
cussing Plato, the ideal of the Platonic text and the figure of 
Socrates never seems far from Gadamer’s own concerns. That 
Gadamer was originally trained as a classicist should never be 
forgotten: ancient Greek texts belong to his own beginning 
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and never left for him. In the conversations we had Gadamer 
always insisted upon the legitimacy of the 7th Letter and upon 
its fundamental importance.  
Your emphasis on Plato’s 7th Letter is quite original and 
e ecially exciting since it poses some of the most interesting 
hermeneutical questions one can ask. Apart from its political 
significance, which is not to be underestimated, that letter leads 
one to ask about the relation of an author to a text, to the na-
ture of a text, and the difference between written and spoken 
language. The form of the letter is also e ecially interesting for 
thinking about the idea of hermeneutics: a letter is addressed to 
another and, in this case, we only have one side of the exchange. 
In short, we are listening to a conversation without being able 
to hear it in its entirety. It is a form of philosophizing quite dif-
ferent from our habitual reliance upon the essay or book, much 
closer to but still not identical with the dialogue form that we 
find in Plato. And the 7th Letter is the letter that comes closest 
to thinking through these  ecial hermeneutical problems.
But what I do know from what I can read, and what I 
know as well from the many conversations we have had over 
the years, is that your interpretation that begins by approach-
ing hermeneutic theory through Plato’s 7th Letter leads very 
much to the heart of the problems of hermeneutics. I have 
learned from you on this and can only say now that I look for-
ward to the conversations we still have to come in the future.
LR: Are there any final thoughts or concerns you would 
like to mention about the situation of philosophy today and 
the task of thinking?  
DS: I have already confessed to my worries about the 
present and future possibilities of philosophy in my answer 
to your second question. Those worries are real, but I confess 
that my hopes for the future of philosophy are still alive. I sus-
pect that we are living in a revolutionary moment for philos-
ophy: it is a time of crisis in which longstanding traditions are 
no longer tenable and forms of communication are changing 
the nature and content of thinking itself. So, I do worry about 
what we might find in the future. But then again there have 
always been difficult times for philosophy, many much more 
challenging than this time. So, one can hope.  
But I must also say that the worries I have about the fu-
ture are real and serious, and I do wonder how philosophy will 
be able to play some role in confronting the challenges of our 
time. We have problems to be addressed: climate change, au-
thoritarian regimes, war, hunger, homelessness, and refugees 
who are being displaced by all of these forces. The question I 
ask is whether we who identify ourselves as philosophers will 
be able to help navigate these crises and to make our world a 
better place, and to secure a better future for our children.  
This remains a challenge to which I cannot offer an an-
swer other than to say remembering what is at stake in thinking 
about our world is at least a start to making things a bit better.
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